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ABSTRACT
In light of recent corporate scandals, numerous proposals have been introduced for reforming
corporate governance. This paper provides a theoretical framework through which to evaluate these
reforms. Unlike various ad hoc arguments, this framework recognizes that governance structures
arise endogenously in response to the constrained optimization problems faced by the relevant
parties. Contract theory provides a set of necessary conditions under which governance reform can
be  welfare-improving:  1)  There  is  asymmetric  information  at  the  time  of  contracting;  or  2)
Governance failures impose externalities on third parties; or 3) The state has access to remedies or
punishments that are not available to third parties. We provide a series of models that illustrate the
importance of these conditions and what can go wrong if they are not met.
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1 Introduction
Corporate governance is again an area of interest. After the scandals at Enron,
Worldcom, and other ﬁrms, many authors, politicians and even practitioners
have called for regulatory changes designed to “improve” governance. Reforms
such as Sarbanes-Oxley (sox), the Cadbury recommendations, and numerous
other proposals emphasize the attention that corporate governance has received
in the public policy arena. Yet, the issue is in fact a very old one; if Smith (1776)
did not write in such an elegant style, some of his Wealth of Nations could have
come from a recent issue of Fortune or Business Week.1 That complaints about
corporate governance being “ineﬀective” have been heard since the beginnings
of the corporate form suggest that corporate governance is not easily “ﬁxed.”
Much of the confusion concerning corporate governance likely arises because
discussion of the issues typically, but implicitly, assumes governance is “out of
equilibrium.” That is, unlike other economic activity, commentators talk as if
the invisible hand has yet to guide governance to an equilibrium point. With
such a mind set, “reforms,” which consist of requiring all ﬁrms to adopt what
seems to be a good idea or has been shown historically to be a trait associated
with good-performing ﬁrms, can seem a sensible course of action. For example,
the sox reform requires a powerful audit committee on the board, and height-
ened personal consequences for directors if the ﬁrm engages in ﬁnancial “miscon-
duct.” Yet, the consequences of ﬁrms voluntarily adopting these measures are
likely to be quite diﬀerent from the involuntary imposition of these measures
on ﬁrms. Just as the labor-market equilibrium is quite diﬀerent when ﬁrms
voluntarily raise wages as opposed to when wages rise because of a government-
imposed minimum wage, the resulting “improvement” in governance from a
regulatory-imposed change could be very diﬀerent from a voluntarily adopted
change.
The paper takes a Coasian (Coase, 1960) perspective, insofar as we view gov-
ernance arrangements as constrained-optimal contracts within the ﬁrm. Given
this view, “reforms” are simply restrictions on these contracts imposed by an
outside authority. In other words, governance reforms are just a special case of
contract regulation. We therefore begin our analysis with a review of the con-
tract theory literature on regulation of contracts. This literature identiﬁes three
conditions under which restrictions on contracts can be welfare improving. In
particular, for externally imposed governance reforms to have to the potential
to improve welfare, there must be asymmetric information at the time of con-
tracting, or externalities on a third party, or access by the regulator (state) to
penalties or other contractual provisions that are not available to private par-
ties, or some combination of these conditions. This insight from contract theory
provides a framework for understanding when governance regulations have the
1“The directors of [joint stock] companies, however, being the managers rather of other
people’s money than of their own, it cannot well be expected, that they should watch over
it with the same anxious vigilance [as owners] ... Negligence and profusion, therefore, must
always prevail, more of less, in the management of the aﬀairs of such a company” (Smith,
1776, p. 700).
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potential to improve welfare, and as such, potentially provide guidance to both
academics wishing to understand governance, and to policy-makers wishing to
improve practice.
We illustrate this principle with two models designed to study the eﬀect of
potential regulatory reforms similar to those recently adopted in Sarbanes-Oxley
and other regulations. Each starts with a model of what governance would look
like in the absence of regulations and derives the implications of alternative
regulatory regimes. In each model, governance is derived endogenously, so that
changes in the regulatory environment can be traced through the governance
structure to their impact on real decisions made by ﬁrms. In each case, the
models illustrate the usefulness of the contract theory framework that derives
which types of reforms could potentially (but not necessarily) lead to welfare
improvements.
We ﬁrst extend Hermalin and Weisbach (1998) and Hermalin’s (2005) adap-
tation of Holmstrom’s (1999) career-concerns model to consider the question of
optimal transparency. Sections 3 through 5 lay out the basics of this model,
in which the company chooses the “quality” of the performance measure that
directors use to assess the CEO’s ability. The CEO can exert eﬀort at distort-
ing this information.2 In this setup, a reform that increases transparency can
be thought of as increasing the minimum acceptable level of reporting quality.
We show that the consequence of such a reform will be to actually increase the
ceo’s incentives to distort information about the ﬁrm. In addition, it will also
lead to an increase in the probability that the ceo will be ﬁred and, because
of both these consequences, an increase in the ceo’s compensation. Moreover,
the combination of these eﬀects can actually be to decrease expected proﬁts.
Thus, the model implies that regulations stipulating better disclosure decreases
eﬃciency, despite the fact that the improved information is put to good use in
employing better quality ceos on average.
In Section 6, we consider reforms that raise the cost to the ceo of concealing
information about the ﬁrm. This version of the model is intended to capture
the provision of the Sarbanes-Oxley act that makes the ceo personally liable
for accounting misrepresentations. This type of reform can increase welfare if
the penalties for misreporting are suﬃciently high. We view this ﬁnding as
consistent with the overall framework, since the state has access to penalties
(e.g., incarceration) that are not available to private parties.
We conclude in Section 7.
2Inderst and Mueller (2005), Singh (2004), and Goldman and Slezak (in press) are three
other recent papers concerned with the ceo’s incentives to distort information. Like us, the
ﬁrst is concerned with the board’s making inferences about the ceo’s ability. Inderst and
Mueller’s approach diﬀers insofar as they assume the ceo possesses information not available
to the board, which the board needs to induce the ceo to reveal. There is no uncertainly
about the ceo’s ability in Singh’s model; he is focused on the board’s obtaining accurate
signals about the ceo’s actions. Goldman and Slezak are concerned primarily with the design
of stock-based compensation.
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2 Implications of Contract Theory for Gover-
nance Reform
Consider a proposed reform of corporate governance that is to be imposed on
ﬁrms by the state. Can such a reform be welfare enhancing? The question is,
in essence, equivalent to one that has been raised in contract theory: Is there
scope for welfare-improving restrictions on private contracts? In the contract
theory literature, three cases have been identiﬁed in which an aﬃrmative answer
can be given: (i) there is asymmetric information between the parties at the
time of contracting (Aghion and Hermalin, 1990; Spier, 1992); (ii) the contract
between the two parties has an externality on a third party (Aghion and Bolton,
1987); or (iii) the courts can impose a remedy or penalty not available to the
parties privately (Hermalin and Katz, 1993, in passing). Moreover, extending
the results of Coase (1960), Hermalin and Katz establish that these are the only
three possible cases in which outside interference in private contracting has the
potential to be welfare improving when agents are rational.3 It is worth noting
that the Hermalin and Katz result applies regardless of whether the contracts
in question are complete or incomplete.
To the extent that corporate governance can be thought of as a set of con-
tracts among the relevant actors, this result provides a useful framework for
evaluating potential reforms to corporate governance. In particular, when eval-
uating a proposed regulation, any potential scope for improvement must come
from the regulation’s corrective eﬀect on asymmetry of information at the time of
contracting;4 externalities on third parties; or the contracting technology (which
could be altered by potential regulations; for example, jail terms for failure to
comply with contractual provisions). While these conditions are not, in some
sense, new—they are among the implicit conditions under which the Coase the-
orem holds—they are often ignored in analyses of corporate governance. These
conditions, while fairly general, limit the scope for beneﬁcial corporate gover-
nance reform. In particular, it is not obvious how many ostensibly sensible
reforms actually fulﬁll them.
One case in which governance reforms oﬀer beneﬁts is when a new regulation
extends the set of feasible contracts. Certainly the existence of criminal penalties
in certain circumstances goes beyond that to which private parties could agree.
In addition, the establishment of a regulatory body and case law, which helps
to eliminate uncertainty about how contractual provisions will be interpreted in
court, could conceivably make it possible for the parties to use a wider range of
provisions than they might otherwise be able to use.
3Hermalin and Katz’s result depends on the private parties being able to bargain to a
constrained eﬃcient solution. For instance, if bargaining is alternating-oﬀer bargaining, then
there is no scope for eﬃciency-enhancing restrictions provided (i) the parties are symmetrically
informed ex ante; (ii) there is no externality on a third party; and (iii) the state does not have
access to more remedies than the parties (see Proposition 4 of Hermalin and Katz).
4While shareholders generally possess less information than management, this asymmetry
of information usually arises post contracting (i.e., once management has already been hired).
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Externalities undoubtedly exist but it is not obvious how they are relevant
to corporate governance. While massive governance failures appear to have
spillovers, as for instance evidenced by the market’s apparent reaction to the
Enron and Worldcom debacles, the vector of contagion is unclear and, therefore,
it is unclear how they should inﬂuence governance reform.5
Finally, asymmetric information could conceivably justify regulatory inter-
ference with private contracting. However, the asymmetric information would
have to exist at the time of contracting. While it is possible that such asymmet-
ric information could exist in some ﬁrms, in general, the most commonly ana-
lyzed cases of asymmetric information are those that occur after management
is in place and has a chance to learn more about their ﬁrms than shareholders.
The existence of ex post asymmetric information (i.e., learned after contracts
are in place) is not suﬃcient to justify regulations; rather, the asymmetry must
exist at the time of contracting to fulﬁll the condition.
3 Optimal Transparency and Corporate Gover-
nance
Among the key elements of Sarbanes-Oxley and other reform proposals are
increased disclosure requirements. Sarbanes-Oxley, for example, requires in-
creased reporting of oﬀ-balance-sheet ﬁnancing and special-purpose entities (e.g.,
the activities that Enron allegedly used to deceive investors). Intuitive argu-
ments, formalized by Diamond and Verrecchia (1991), suggest that the cost of
capital should decrease when ﬁrms provide better information about their com-
panies. Indeed, Leuz and Verrecchia (2000) ﬁnd evidence suggesting that ﬁrms’
cost of capital does decrease when they voluntarily switch to a reporting regime
that requires greater disclosure.
However, it is not obvious that just because ﬁrms appear to beneﬁt when
they voluntarily increase disclosure that all ﬁrms should be required to have
higher disclosure. In particular, higher disclosure likely leads to a behavioral
response by market participants; the overall welfare change will incorporate
the impact of these responses. To evaluate the eﬀect of mandated changes in
transparency, it is important to have a model of disclosure in which participants’
5Presumably the Enron and Worldcom ﬁascos either conveyed news to the market or
they spooked na¨ ıve traders. If the latter, then the consequence, in the short term at least, is
essentially distributional—sophisticated traders simply proﬁted from na¨ ıve traders’ mistakes—
and hence irrelevant to welfare. If the former, then the news might be of the form that some
governance feature is not as strong as previously thought, but then this (i) is not precisely an
externality that Enron or Worldcom have imposed on other ﬁrms; (ii) is potentially remediable
through private action; and (iii) presumably was an unforeseen event that those writing
regulations would have been no more likely to anticipate than the private parties. Another
possible bit of “news” is that these scandals could have caused sophisticated investors to
anticipate costly government reaction. In this case, Enron and Worldcom could be seen as
having imposed an externality by not exercising suﬃcient precaution, but it is a peculiar
externality because it is due to an essentially irrational political reaction that is precisely
contrary to this paper’s arguments.
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responses to disclosure changes are endogenously determined inside the model.6
We present such a model below. The focus of the model is the relation-
ship between the ceo and the board. The board’s function is to assess the
ceo’s ability based on the information available to it, and to replace him if
the assessment is too low. The ceo receives private beneﬁts from controlling
the company, so he has incentives to do what he can to inﬂuence the board’s
decision in his favor, which, in the model, consists of distorting, favorably, the
information to which the board has access. Exogenous regulatory changes that
aﬀect disclosure quality thus aﬀect both the information available to the board,
and the ceo’s response to the information.
3.1 Timing of the Model
The model has the following timing, which is adapted from Hermalin (2005).
Stage 1. The board of directors (ﬁrm) establishes a level of reporting quality, q (its
choice may be constrained by legal restrictions—e.g., sec requirements).
The board also hires a ceo from a pool of ex ante identical would-be ceos.
A given ceo’s ability, α, is an independent random draw from a normal
distribution with mean 0 and variance 1/τ. Normalizing the mean of the
ability distribution to zero is purely for convenience and is without loss of
generality.
Stage 2.T h eceo takes private actions that aﬀect the board’s perception of how
he (the ﬁrm) is doing. Assume these actions can be summarized by a
uni-dimensional variable, e ∈ R+.7
Stage 3. After the ceo has worked for some point and has taken actions designed
to improve the board’s perception of him, the board acquires a private
signal, y, about the ceo’s ability. The signal is distributed normally with
a mean equal to α + e and a variance equal to 1/q. Letting the precision,
q, of the distribution be the same as the quality of reporting, q, is without
loss of generality as we are free to normalize “reporting quality” using
whatever metric we wish.8
Stage 4. On the basis of the signal, the board updates its estimate of the ceo’s
ability. Based on this posterior estimate, the board may decide to ﬁre
6The endogenous determination of disclosure is one of the dimensions that diﬀerentiates
this paper from Goldman and Slezak (in press); in their article they treat disclosure rules as
being set exogenously.
7Speciﬁcally, if a is a vector of activities, we are assuming that there is a function e(a)
that maps their collective inﬂuence on to the board’s perception of how the ﬁrm is doing. If
˜ k(a)i st h eceo’s disutility from pursuing those activities, then the function k(·), introduced
infra, is deﬁned as k(e)=m i n˜ k(a) subject to e(a)=e.
8Hermalin and Weisbach (1998) and Hermalin (2005) adopt an alternative formulation in
which the precision is ﬁxed, but the variable in question (i.e., q) is simply the probability
that the board observes the signal. As Hermalin shows, however, the two approaches lead to
essentially the same analysis (see his §VI).
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the ceo and hire a replacement. A replacement ceo’s ability is a random
draw from a normal distribution with mean 0 and variance 1/τ. Hiring a
replacement incurs a ﬁring cost of f>0. This can be seen as the cost of
the disruption that occurs if the ceo is ﬁred or the cost of searching for a
new ceo or both.
Stage 5. Revenues are realized. Revenues equal α + ε, where E{ε} = E{ε|α} =0
and α is the ability of the ceo in place at this ﬁnal stage.9 The random
variables y and ε are independently distributed.
3.2 Preferences and Ability
If the ceo in hired at Stage 1 survives to Stage 5, he receives a control beneﬁt
of b>0. If he is dismissed prior to this stage (or not hired at all), then he
receives a beneﬁt of 0.
The ceo hired at Stage 1 is also compensated with a wage, w.10 This wage
is paid regardless of whether the ceo survives to Stage 5. The wage paid a
replacement ceo is assumed to be embedded in f, the disruption cost.
A ceo’s ability is ﬁxed throughout his career. We follow Holmstrom (1999)
by assuming that the ceo, like the board, knows only the distribution of his
ability. We justify this assumption by noting that the uncertainty about a ceo’s
ability in a particular job is largely uncertainty about the match between him
and the job, which is similarly unknown to both the board and the ceo.
The expected utility of a ceo hired at Stage 1 is
w + bPr{not ﬁred}−k(e), (1)
where k(·) is a strictly convex and twice diﬀerentiable function. Assume k(0) =
k (0) = 0 and that k (e) > 0f o re>0. To ensure existence of a pure-strategy
equilibrium, we maintain the following:
Assumption 1 infe∈R+ k  (e) >b τexp(−1/2)/
√
2π.
The initially hired ceo has a reservation utility, uR ≥ b. That is, (1) cannot
be less than uR. Requiring that uR not be less than b rules out a negative wage.
We assume that individual directors like higher earnings. Following Hermalin
and Weisbach (1998), we assume the preferences of the individual directors can
be aggregated in such a way that the board acts as if it is a single risk-neutral
decision maker with respect to ﬁrm proﬁts. Without further loss of generality,
we can, thus, take the board’s utility as equal to ﬁrm proﬁts.
9It would not change the analysis—other than to complicate the notation—to add a pos-
itive constant to revenues so that the probability of negative revenues was arbitrarily small.
Similarly, the analysis would be unaﬀected if we assumed α+ε were earnings net of production
costs but gross of the ceo’s compensation and governance costs.
10Because the signal y is private, it cannot be the basis of compensation. Because ﬁnal
revenues are not a function of managerial action, there is no reason to tie this compensation
to ﬁnal revenues (i.e., to use an incentive contract). If the ceo were are at all risk averse, it
would be strictly better to pay him a ﬂat wage.
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3.3 Updating Beliefs and Monitoring
As we detail later, in equilibrium the board will correctly infer what level of
distortionary eﬀort, e,t h eceo has spent. Hence, it can subtract out that
inferred level, ˆ e,f r o my to get a pure signal of ability, ˆ y ≡ y − ˆ e. Deﬁne
˜ y = y −e. As noted, in equilibrium, ˜ y =ˆ y. As a benchmark, we will work with
˜ y in this section.
Suppose, for the time being, that the board either observed e (rather than
inferred it) or that e was constant. After the signal, y, is observed, the players
update their beliefs about the ceo’s ability. The posterior estimates of the mean




and τ  = τ + q, (2)
respectively (see, e.g., DeGroot, 1970, p. 167, for a proof). The posterior
distribution of ability is also normal.
We assumed that the distribution of the signal ˜ y given the ceo’s true ability,
α, is normal with mean α and variance 1/q; hence, the distribution of ˜ y given
the prior estimate of the ceo’s ability, 0, is normal with mean 0 and variance




to be the precision of ˜ y given the prior estimate of ability, 0.12
Observe that the board’s posterior estimate of a ceo’s ability is also expected
revenues. After ﬁxing (sinking) the ceo’s wage and any other costs, it is also
expected proﬁts.
The alternative to retaining the incumbent ceo at stage 4 is to replace
him. The expected revenues from a replacement are, by assumption, zero. The
expected proﬁt from a replacement ceo is, therefore, −f (i.e., expected revenue
less disruption costs). Subsequent to obtaining a signal, ˜ y, the incumbent ceo






Given this option of dismissal, the ﬁrm’s expected value prior to receiving





































11The random variable ˜ y is the sum of two independently distributed normal variables ˜ y−α
(i.e., the error in ˜ y)a n dα; hence, ˜ y is also normally distributed. The means of these two
random variables are both zero, so the mean of ˜ y is, thus, 0. The variance of the two variables
are 1/q and 1/τ respectively, so the variance ˜ y is 1/q +1 /τ.
12As a convention, functions of many variables, such as H, will be denoted by capital letters.
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where φ(·) is the density function of a standard normal random variable (i.e.,
with mean zero and variance one) and Φ(·) is the corresponding distribution
function. The second line follows from the ﬁrst using the change of variables
z ≡ ˜ y
√









1 − Φ(Z)=Φ ( −Z) (4)
is the probability that the ceo will be retained after the board observes the
signal.
Lemma 1 Taking ceo compensation, w, as ﬁxed, the ﬁrm’s expected value is
increasing in the quality of reporting, q (i.e., ∂V/∂q > 0).
4 CEO Choice of Eﬀort
As noted earlier, the board wishes to base its ﬁring decision on ˜ y; that is, the
signal y with the ceo’s eﬀorts subtracted out. To calculate ˜ y from y, the board
needs to know e,t h eceo’s eﬀorts. Because, however, the board doesn’t observe
e, it can only subtract out the amount of eﬀort it anticipates the ceo expended,
ˆ e (in a pure-strategy equilibrium, ˆ e and e will be the same).
Based on its inference, the board bases its ﬁring decision on ˆ y = y − ˆ e.I t
will, therefore, ﬁre the ceo if
ˆ y<Y; (5)
that is, if
y − ˆ e =˜ y + e − ˆ e<Y, or
˜ y<Y+ˆ e − e. (6)
The Y in expressions (5) and (6) is the same as in (3).
Using (4), the ceo’s expected utility as a function of e is
bΦ






The ceo chooses e to maximize (7) given his anticipation of the board’s belief
about his eﬀort, ˆ e. The ﬁrst-order condition is
bφ





H − k (e)=0. (8)
In a pure-strategy equilibrium, the board must correctly anticipate the ceo’s








H − k (e∗)=0. (9)
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Because k (·) is strictly monotonic, with a range of [0,∞), a unique e∗ exists
that solves (9). In other words, if a pure-strategy equilibrium exists, then it is
unique and, in it, the ceo supplies eﬀort e∗. Because k (0) = 0, e∗ > 0.
The one remaining step is, thus, to establish that a pure-strategy equilibrium
exists:
Lemma 2 Under Assumption 1, a pure-strategy equilibrium exists and is uni-
que.
Without Assumption 1 it is possible that no pure-strategy equilibrium exists.
Fixing the board’s expectation of the ceo’s eﬀort, the ceo’s marginal beneﬁt of
trying to inﬂuence the board’s beliefs about his ability is increasing in b and H.
The reason it is increasing in b is obvious. The greater the conditional precision
of the signal, H, the more weight the board places on the signal, which increases
the ceo’s motivation to distort it. In equilibrium, however, the board has to
form correct expectations. If the ceo’s incentives to distort the signal are large,
then the board will expect the ceo to choose a high level of eﬀort. Because of
the cost he bears, at some point it ceases to be worth it to the ceo to “live
up” to the board’s expectations if those expectations are too great. In other
words, it is possible that, absent Assumption 1, the only candidate pure-strategy
equilibrium entails an expected level of eﬀort that is so great that it does not
maximize the ceo’s expected utility to meet that expectation.13 Assumption 1
eﬀectively sets an upper bound on bH that ensures that board’s expectation
won’t be so great as to induce the ceo not to live up to it.
An important issue is what is the eﬀect of an increase in q, the quality of
reporting, on e∗, the equilibrium level of distortionary eﬀort?
Proposition 1 The ceo’s equilibrium eﬀort at distortion increases with the
quality of reporting; that is, de∗/dq > 0.
Proposition 1 demonstrates that a potential unintended consequence of higher
quality reporting is greater eﬀort by management (the ceo) to distort informa-
tion about performance.
The ceo’s chance of dismissal is also increasing in q. To see this, diﬀerentiate





(q + τ)2 < 0.
Hence,
Proposition 2 The ceo’s equilibrium probability of being ﬁred increases with
the quality of reporting.
13Although e = e∗ is always a local maximum of the ceo’s utility, it ceases to be a global
maximum when bH gets too large. See Hermalin (2005) for details.
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5 Optimal Reporting Quality
The ceo will accept employment in Stage 1 only if his expected utility exceeds
his reservation utility; that is, only if




≥ uR . (10)
All else equal, the board prefers that w be as small as possible, which means
the ceo’s participation constraint, (10), binds. Substituting that constraint
into expected proﬁts net of ceo compensation, the ﬁrm’s expected proﬁt (and,

















There is no reason a priori to expect (11) to be concave in q or to have an
interior maximum. For instance, consider the case in which the set of possible
reporting qualities, q,i s[ q,∞), q > 0, and k(e)=e2/2.14 When bfτ ≥ 1, we
have the following:
Proposition 3 Suppose the lowest possible level of reporting quality, q, is strictly
positive and k(e)=e2/2.T h e n ,i fbfτ ≥ 1, the level of reporting quality that
maximizes expected ﬁrm proﬁt subject to the ceo’s participation constraint is
q = q.
The parameter q should be seen as the minimum possible quality of reporting.
As such, it reﬂects the bounds imposed on the ﬁrm by sec and other reporting
requirements, as well as the fact that some information will be available to
directors through press stories and other similar channels.
The intuition behind Proposition 3 is as follows. With a large private beneﬁt,
b,t h eceo’s motivation to invest in distorting behavior is also large. The ﬁrm
(directors) must, in a sense, compensate the ceo for this investment. In addi-
tion, the ﬁrm must also compensate the ceo for the risk of losing that beneﬁt.
Combined, these two eﬀects can be so large that the directors wish to commit
as much as possible ex ante to keeping the ceo. They do this by choosing to
have low-quality reporting, because this translates into the board’s being less
responsive to the signal (i.e., y) than they it would be if y were a more precise
signal.
Observe that, under the assumptions of Proposition 3, the proﬁt-maximizing
quality of reporting is the smallest allowed level, q. That is, the beneﬁts of more
accurate information as identiﬁed by Lemma 1 can be dominated completely
by the adverse consequences discussed above.15 Consequently, if the eﬀect of
reforms such as Sarbanes-Oxley is to raise q, then reforms will serve to reduce
ﬁrms’ proﬁts.
14If k(e)=e2/2, then Assumption 1 requires b<
￿
2π exp(1)/τ (i.e., roughly, bτ < 4.133).
15A large literature in accounting emphasizes the usefulness of accounting information for
the purpose of improving contracts among parties, including bondholders, managers, and
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Corollary 1 Under the assumptions of Proposition 3, if the eﬀect of externally
imposed reforms is to raise the minimum permissible quality of reporting infor-
mation, q, then these reforms will cause (i) a fall in ﬁrm proﬁts; (ii) an increase
in the ceo turnover rate; and (iii) an increase in ceo compensation.
Proof: Follows immediately from Lemma 1 and Propositions 2 and 3.
Proposition 3 and its corollary have clear implications for thinking about
reforms that change reporting requirements. While such reforms leader to bet-
ter information about managerial performance, they can also lead to higher
management compensation and more—ultimately wasted—eﬀort at distorting
information by management. As such, these results illustrate the point made
more generally in Section 2 about the cost of externally imposed restrictions on
private contracting.
Point (iii) of the corollary is, in fact, quite general.
Proposition 4 The ceo’s equilibrium compensation, w, is increasing in the
level of reporting quality, q.
The analysis has so far focused on the case when the ceo’s private beneﬁt,
b, is relatively large. When it is small, the amount the ceo has at risk and,
thus, his incentive to invest in distortionary eﬀort is likewise small. Numerical
calculations—see Figure 1—show that expected proﬁt (i.e., expression (11))
can start to rise in q once q is large enough. In contrast, for b large (i.e., under
the assumptions of Proposition 3), a graph similar to Figure 1 would show an
everywhere decreasing Π(q).
For the situation depicted in Figure 1, the optimal q depends on the value
of q. If, for example, q corresponds to the line  1 in Figure 1, then q is optimal.
If, however, it corresponds to the line  2, then the largest possible value of q is
optimal.
Figure 1 suggests the possibility of a tipping dynamic vis-` a-vis regulation.
For low levels of regulation (e.g., those corresponding to  1), the regulations
are binding insofar as the ﬁrm chooses the lowest quality reporting permitted.
However, once the regulations go above a certain point—for instance, the point
at which the Π(q) curve crosses the asymptote line in Figure 1—the ﬁrm would
optimal wish to make the quality of reporting as large as possible. For example,
in the ﬁgure, suppose that a regulation raised the minimum level from q = .05
(approximately  1)t oq = .3 (approximately the value that minimizes Π(q)).
The ﬁrm would respond by, then, raising q as high as possible.
Observation 1 The following scenario is possible: At a low enough minimum
level of reporting quality, a ﬁrm optimally adopts this lowest permitted quality
of reporting. At a high enough minimum, however, the ﬁrm jumps to requiring
other ﬁrms (see Watts and Zimmerman, 1986, especially pages 312–317, for discussion and
references). A more compete model, that incorporated these demands for more accurate
information, could well lead to a higher optimal value for q. Alternatively, q could be seen as
the lowest value of q consistent with meeting these other demands.
Draft 2/6/2006 Version 11Hermalin and Weisbach Optimal Reporting Quality 12














Figure 1: Plot of expected proﬁt, Π(q) (i.e., expression (11)) under the assump-
tions that k(e)=e2/2, b =1 , f =1 /5, τ =1 ,a n dp(q)=q. Observe
the asymptote corresponds to limq→∞ Π(q) ≈ .81.
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the maximum possible level of reporting quality, a level strictly greater than the
minimum required.
The intuition behind this insight is as follows. As discussed, in setting q the
board is trading oﬀ two factors. On the one hand, as shown by Lemma 1, raising
q increases ﬁrm value ceteris paribus. On the other hand, raising q lowers the
ceo’s utility, both because it increases the probability he will be dismissed and
because it induces him to expend more eﬀort in distortionary activities. The
ceo must be compensated for this loss of utility, which means his wage rises.
In the scenario illustrated in Figure 1, initially the marginal cost of increasing
q exceeds the marginal beneﬁt. At some point, however, q gets suﬃciently
large that the value −Y
√
H is suﬃciently far into the right tail of the normal
distribution that a further push into the tail increases the ceo’s incentive to
distort the signal by only a small amount (see expression (9)) and raises the
probability that he is ﬁred by only a small amount, so the overall increase in
disutility is small. Consequently, the ﬁrm’s marginal cost of increasing q can
fall below the ﬁrm’s marginal beneﬁt of doing so.
6 Raising the Cost of Concealment
One view of reforms, such as Sarbanes-Oxley, is that they raise the cost to man-
agement of distorting information by imposing criminal penalties on managers
who misreport information. In doing so, sox falls into the category of reforms
that, according to contract theory, could potentially increase welfare. Recall, as
noted in Section 2, private contracts cannot impose criminal penalties, which
means there is a scope for such reforms to be welfare improving insofar as they
represent the creation of a remedy not available privately to the parties in ques-
tion.
To model the situation we suppose, now, that q>0 is ﬁxed exogenously.
What is endogenous is the probability p that the board does not observe the
signal, y. In this version of the model, p, is chosen by the ceo in Stage 2 along
with e. The cost to the ceo is c(p,r), where r is a parameter (e.g., a reporting
standard) that aﬀects the ceo’s cost of increasing the odds that the signal is
hidden from the board. We assume
Assumption 2 The cost function c(·,·) satisﬁes
(i) c(0,r)=0and ∂c(0,r)/∂p =0for all r;
(ii) ∂c(1,r)/∂p = ∞ for all r;
(iii) ∂c(p,r)/∂p ≥ 0 and ∂2c(p,r)/∂p2 > 0 for all r;a n d
(iv) ∂c(p,r)/∂r ≥ 0 and ∂2c(p,r)/∂p∂r > 0 for all r and all p ∈ (0,1).
In essence, Assumption 2 establishes that the cost function is well behaved and
that an increase in r raises both the total cost and the marginal cost of eﬀorts
to hide the signal.
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The cost c(p,r) can be interpreted in a number of ways. One interpretation
is that r is the probability that the ceo’s eﬀorts to hide the signal are detected,
in which case his penalty is an increasing function of his eﬀorts to hide the sig-
nal, p. Another interpretation is that r is the penalty if caught trying to conceal
the signal and the probability of being caught is greater the more egregious the
eﬀorts to hide the signal. Yet another interpretation is that r is a parameter-
ization of the nuisances, obstacles, or other costs (e.g., signing certiﬁcates of
having reviewed the ﬁnancial accounts) associated with hiding the signal and
that these costs are greater the more eﬀort is going into hiding the signal.
The ceo’s expected utility is
w + bPr{not ﬁred}−k(e) − c(p,r)
= w + b

p +( 1− p)Φ





− k(e) − c(p,r).
(12)
Observe that the cross-partial derivative of expression (12) with respect to
e and p is negative; that is, eﬀort at concealment, p, and eﬀort at distortion, e,
are substitute activities for the ceo.
Because 1−p<1, Assumption 1 is still suﬃcient for the ceo to play a pure
strategy with respect to his choice of e. Moreover, because the ceo’s beneﬁts
are linear in p and his costs convex in p, he has a unique best response in terms
of p as well. From Assumption 2(i) and (ii) that optimal p is in the interval
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From Assumption 2(iv) and (14), it follows that p∗  (r) < 0. In turn, that
result, expression (13), and the convexity of k(·) imply that e∗  (r) > 0. To
summarize:
Lemma 3 An increase in the parameter r results in the ceo expending less
eﬀort on hiding the signal (i.e., p∗  (r) < 0) and more eﬀort on distorting the
signal (i.e., e∗  (r) > 0).
Recall that the ceo’s participation constraint is binding. Consequently, the
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Similar to expression (11) earlier, there is no reason to expect ex ante that
expression (15) is concave in r or admits an interior solution. In fact, depending
on the functional forms and the parameter values it is possible that the optimal
r is the smallest possible r, the largest possible r, or potentially some level in
the middle. For example it can be shown that if




(note c(p,r) ≥ 0 and satisﬁes Assumption 2), then
• the optimal r =0i fq =4 /10, τ =1 ,f =1 /5, and b = 1; but
• the optimal r →∞if q =4 /10, τ =1 ,f =1 /5, and b =1 /3.
The fact that the optimal r could be inﬁnite means, in theory, increasing
the limit on penalties for concealing information could be welfare improving. In
other words, if there is some r such that r ≤ r and that constraint is binding
because of limits on penalties, then strengthening penalties is welfare improv-
ing. On the other hand, the fact that the optimal r could be zero means, in
theory, that mandating increased penalties could be welfare reducing. In other
words, if there is some r such that r ≥ r and that constraint is binding because
of mandatory minimum penalties, then further increasing penalties is welfare
reducing. To summarize
Proposition 5 When the ceo can take eﬀorts to conceal the signal, then in-
creasing the limit on penalties can, but won’t necessarily, increase welfare. Fur-
thermore, raising the mandatory penalties can, but won’t necessarily, reduce
welfare.
In other words, Proposition 5 indicates that there is no obvious social policy
with respect to the penalties imposed externally on ceos who seek to conceal
information.
7 Conclusion
In response to the spate of recent corporate scandals, countries have passed
a number of “reforms” aimed at improving corporate governance. Economics,
despite a long history of studying regulation, has been slow, in the case of gov-
ernance reforms, to provide a conceptual framework for their evaluation. Such
a framework requires treating governance institutions as endogenous, so that
we can evaluate behavioral changes in response to a new governance restric-
tion. This paper provides models of endogenous governance and studies some
commonly discussed reforms such as those in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act.
Our model is an extension of the Holmstrom (1999) career-concerns model.
In our model, a ceo is evaluated by his board and receives a wage and private
beneﬁts from the job. The board receives a signal about the ceo’s performance,
and will replace the ceo if, by its best estimate, a replacement ceo is expected
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to yield greater proﬁts than the current one (once transition costs are accounted
for). The ceo can exert eﬀort to distort the signal the board receives and has
incentives to do so because of the private beneﬁts associated with the job. We
assume that the board can specify ex ante how informative a signal the board
will receive and the informativeness of the signal is assumed to be known at the
time the ceo agrees to a contract.
In this model, we ﬁrst evaluated a reform that increases the minimum preci-
sion of the signal (minimum quality of reporting). In equilibrium, this increase
leads to higher turnover of ceos, and greater compensation for ceos. The in-
crease in compensation can outweigh the beneﬁt of better information about
the ceo, so that a ﬁrm’s proﬁts fall in response to a reform that increases the
minimum quality of reporting.
We next considered a model in which the government can increase the costs
borne by the ceo when he tries to conceal information. This type of reform
can increase value if (i) the increase represents imposing costs on the ceo that
are greater than those that can be imposed privately (e.g., criminalizing the
concealment of information with jail time as a punishment); and (ii) the ﬁrm’s
objective function (e.g., expression (15)) is everywhere increasing in the costs
levied on the ceo. Observe that for this reform to be welfare improving, the
increased cost must represent a punishment unavailable to the parties privately
(e.g., incarceration).
For many years, people have tried to make the case that something is
“wrong” with corporate governance and we should “reform” it. This view
ignores the reality that the observed system of governance has been around for
a long time and appears to be the market solution. Many proposed governance
reforms, such as increased disclosure, or requirements about the composition of
the board or ceo salaries, could have been chosen by the market but in fact
were not. Models of endogenous governance provide a start to understanding
the reasons why the market might not have picked a contracting arrangement
that, on its face, seems appealing. This paper provides a ﬁrst step in this type
of analysis; we expect that, in the future, more such work will greatly improve
our understanding of governance reform.
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Appendix: Proofs










































(q + τ)2 > 0, (16)
where the second fraction in the last line is ∂H/∂q > 0.
Proof of Lemma 2: It was established in the text that if a pure-strategy
equilibrium exists, then it is unique.
By construction e = e∗ solves the ﬁrst-order condition for the ceo’s problem
of maximizing his expected utility when the board anticipates he will choose
eﬀort e∗;t h a ti s ,e = e∗ is a solution to
bφ





H − k (e)=0. (17)
If the ceo’s objective function, expression (7), is globally concave in e when
ˆ e = e∗, then expression (17) is suﬃcient as well as necessary; moreover, it deﬁnes
a global maximum. This means that e = e∗ is the ceo’s unique best response
to the board’s anticipating his eﬀort will be e∗; that is, that a pure-strategy
equilibrium exists.
To establish the concavity of the objective function, we need to show the
derivative of (17) is negative. Deﬁne
S(e)=( e − e∗ − Y )
√
H.



















≤ bφ(1)H − inf
e∈R+
k  (e) (19)
≤ bφ(1)τ − inf
e∈R+
k  (e) (20)
< 0, (21)
where
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(18) follows because S (e)=
√
H;
(19) follows because the solution to the problem maxs∈R −sφ(s)i ss = −1 (the
ﬁrst-order condition is −φ(s)+s2φ(s) = 0, which has two solutions s =1
and s = −1; but only the second satisﬁes the second-order condition);
(20) follows because ∂H/∂q = τ2/(p + τ)2 > 0; hence, H is maximized by
letting q →∞ ; but limq→∞ H = τ;a n d
(21) follows from Assumption 1 because φ(1) = exp(−1/2)/
√
2π.
Proof of Proposition 1: Given that k (·) is monotonic, it follows from











































Proof of Proposition 3: Let Π equal the expression in (11). Straightforward











bfτ2 + q(bfτ − 1)
	
.
That expression is positive for all q if bfτ ≥ 1. It follows, therefore, that Π is
maximized by setting q equal to the minimum possible q, q.















e∗ (q) > 0 by Proposition 1 and ∂Z/∂q > 0 by (16) and connected discussion.
Hence, the last expression is positive as was to be shown.
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